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Abstract
We present an analytical framework to examine the open economy monetary
policy rule of a central bank under asymmetric preferences. The resulting policy
rule is then empirically examined using quarterly data with regards to Canada,
and the UK from 1983q1-2007q4. Our empirical investigation shows that the open
economy policy rule receives support from the data and that the monetary policy
makers in the UK and Canada have asymmetric preferences. Robustness checks
based on model calibration provide support for the suggested policy rule.
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1 Introduction
It is well accepted that monetary policy plays an essential role in providing a stable
macroeconomic background to facilitate the efficient allocation of resources. To demon-
strate that such an economic environment can be achieved by adopting an optimal mon-
etary policy framework, researchers have proposed several alternative models. For in-
stance, a large number of studies advocate the adoption of inflation targeting and its
implementation through variants of the Taylor rule.1 Yet researchers have mainly focused
on closed economy models arguing that the impact of foreign factors on the monetary
policy is small, and that their effects can be excluded.2
However, given that exchange rates respond to foreign disturbances and, as a result
affect domestic prices, it is somewhat surprising to overlook the importance of exchange
rate movements on the monetary transmission mechanism. To that end, Ball (1999b)
shows that although the variants of the Taylor rule are optimal in a closed economy
framework these policies perform poorly in an open economy unless they are modified
to account for the movements in the exchange rates. Svensson (2000) argues that the
optimal reaction function in an open economy accounts for more information than that
in a closed economy. He discusses the presence of various direct and indirect channels
through which the exchange rate can affect monetary policy and shows that CPI inflation
responds to foreign variables including the foreign inflation rate, the foreign interest rate,
exchange rate and shocks from the rest of the world. Many other researchers, including
Gali and Monacelli (2005), Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), and Adolfson et al. (2008),
implement open economy DSGE models and show that exchange rate movements affect
central bank behavior.
1Researchers have examined different variants of the Taylor rule by introducing backward or forward
looking components to linear or nonlinear objective functions. Among others see for instance Taylor
(1993), Svensson (1997), Ball (1999a), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Ireland (1999), Clarida et al.
(2000), Dolado et al. (2004), and Surico (2007).
2For instance Taylor (2001) argues that changes in exchange rates are implicitly incorporated in
prices and therefore closed economy models capture an open economy scenario. Clarida et al. (2001)
document that open economy models are isomorphic to the closed economy models. Among others also
see McCallum and Nelson (2000), Clarida et al. (2002), Batini et al. (2003), Dennis (2003), Leitemo and
So¨derstro¨m (2005), and D’Adamo (2011).
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Researchers have also been challenging the common assumption that policy makers
minimize a quadratic loss function subject to a linear IS equation and a linear Phillips
curve. Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) suggest that a central bank responds strongly to
inflation when the economy is expanding and to the output gap when the economy is
contracting. Dolado et al. (2005) relax the assumption of a linear Phillips curve allowing
for both inflation and the loss function to be convex functions of the output gap. Several
other researchers, including Nobay and Peel (1998), Ruge-Murcia (2000, 2003), Dolado
et al. (2004), Surico (2003, 2007), have also assumed that central banks accommodate a
linear exponential (i.e. linex) loss function. The parameter estimates from such a model,
which utilizes a linex loss function, allow the researcher to determine the asymmetric
responses of the policy makers as the actual inflation or the level of output exceeds or
falls short of the target.3 For instance, a positive value for the asymmetry parameter
associated with inflation would suggest that the central bank is more worried about the
inflation exceeding the set target level rather than falling below it. In this case, the policy
maker is expected to take a more rigorous action when the target is exceeded in contrast
to the opposite case.4
In this paper, in contrast with the existing literature, we investigate the optimal
open economy monetary policy rule of a central bank under the assumption that policy
makers have asymmetric preferences. In doing so we first derive a closed form solution of
the optimal monetary policy employing an open economy New-Keynesian model where
the policy makers minimize a linear exponential loss function. Using data from two
small economies, the UK and Canada, we then estimate the resulting policy rule and
carry out a calibration exercise to check the validity of our modeling approach. In this
framework, the certainty equivalence principle does not hold and uncertainty induces
prudent behavior on the part of the central bank. Hence, the policy rule derived for our
3Note that since the quadratic loss function corresponds to a special case where the asymmetry
parameter of the linex loss function is equal to zero, one can test the null hypothesis of quadratic
preferences against the alternative of asymmetric preferences.
4In this context, positive asymmetry implies that positive errors are more painfull than negative
errors. Therefore, the central bank will implement policies that generate negative errors by overpredicting
inflation.
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framework differs from the earlier research as we demonstrate that the policy makers
not only respond asymmetrically to deviations of inflation and the output gap from their
respective targets, but they also react to changes in the real exchange rate, the base
country output-gap and the base country real interest rate.
We estimate the resulting policy rule by implementing the generalized method of
moments methodology for Canada, and the UK over 1983q1-2007q4. In our empirical
investigation we take US as the base country. We find that monetary policy makers
at the Bank of Canada (BoC) and the Bank of England (BoE) have asymmetric pref-
erences. In particularly, we find that while policy makers at the BoC have negative
output-gap asymmetry, those at the BoE have positive inflation and positive output-gap
asymmetry. These observations should not be too surprising as earlier research, albeit
using different analytical frameworks and empirical methodologies, have pointed out at
the asymmetric preferences of policy makers. For instance, Komlan (2013), implement-
ing threshold regression methodology, has investigated the asymmetric preferences of the
Bank of Canada with regards to inflation and output gap and shown that the asymmetry
parameter associated with inflation gap is statistically significant. For the UK, Taylor
and Davradakis (2006), using threshold models, have provided evidence that although
the stated objective of the Bank of England is to pursue a symmetric inflation target,
the policy makers in practice respond rigorously once expected inflation is significantly
above the 2.5% target. Likewise Boinet and Martin (2008) have shown that the Bank of
England pursue an asymmetric inflation target but not for the output gap.5 We differ
from the above studies as our framework requires us to consider the effects of the real
exchange rate and the output gap as well as the real interest rate of the base country (in
our case the US) on the domestic policy rule while we examine asymmetric preferences
of the policy makers. To that end our empirical investigation and the robustness checks
based on model calibration provide support for the suggested policy rule.
5Also see Dolado et al. (2005) who presented evidence that several central banks behave nonlinearly
since 1980’s, reacting more strongly to deviations above the targets than to deviations below the targets
in inflation and output.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our analytical model.
Section 3 discusses the empirical issues and the data. Section 4 lays out our empirical
results while Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
In this section, we examine the asymmetric responses of policy makers to deviations of
inflation and the output gap from their respective targets within the context of an open
economy New-Keynesian framework similar to that in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) and
Walsh (2010). The dynamics of the open economy are given by the following three
equations each of which describes the behavior of the output gap, inflation and the
exchange rate, respectively.
xt = α0 + α1Etxt+1 − α2(it − Etpit+1)− α3(Etqt+1 − qt) + α4(Ety
f
t+1 − y
f
t ) + ε
y
t+1(1)
pit = β1Etpit+1 + β2xt − β3(Etqt+1 − qt) + β4(qt − qt−1) + ε
pi
t+1 (2)
qt = Etqt+1 − (it − Epit+1) + (i
f
t − Epi
f
t+1) (3)
It is worth noting that (1) and (2) are reduced form equations that one can obtain from
an open economy new-Keynesian DSGE model. These two equations can be rewritten
as:
xt =
ρ
σγ
+ Etxt+1 −
1
σγ
(it − Etpit+1)−
γ
σγ(1− γ)
(Etqt+1 − qt) +[
(σ − σγ)− γ(1− υ)(η + σγ)
η + σγ
]
(Ety
f
t+1 − y
f
t ) +
(
1 + η
η + σγ
)
εyt+1 (4)
pit = βEtpit+1 + (σγ + η)
(1− ω)(1− βω)
ω
xt −
βγ
1− γ
(Etqt+1 − qt) +
γ
1− γ
(qt − qt−1) + ε
pi
t+1 (5)
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with
xt = yt − y˜t,
y˜t =
σ − σγ
η + σγ
yft −
1 + η
η + σγ
εyt ,
ρ = β−1 − 1, σγ =
σ
1− γ2(1− ασ)
,
υ = ασ + (ασ − 1)(1− γ),
where β is the discount factor, γ is the share of foreign goods in the consumer price index,
α is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign consumption
goods and σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.6 Superscript f denotes the
base country variables.
Note that β2 = (σγ + η)
(1−ω)(1−βω)
ω
is the price stickyness parameter, where (1 − ω)
denotes the fraction of firms that set their prices optimally at each point of time. The
intertemporal rate of substitution of labor supply is captured by η. Equation 4 presents
an open economy forward looking aggregate demand curve (IS-curve) and equation 5 is
an open economy New-Keynesian Phillips curve. At any point in time t, the domestic
output gap is denoted by xt, the domestic nominal interest rate is it, inflation is pit and
the real exchange rate, defined as the ratio of cost of foreign goods measured in domestic
currency relative to domestic goods is qt = SP
∗/P c, where S is the nominal exchange
rate. P ∗ and P c denote the prices of goods produced in foreign and home countries,
respectively. Given the information set at time t the expected value of variable ut+1 is
denoted by Etut+1.
6Equations (4) and (5) are similar to Walsh (2010): xt = Etxt+1 −
1
σγ
(it − Etpi
H
t+1−ρ˜t) (9.92) and
piHt = βEtpi
H
t+1+ k(σγ + η)xt (9.93), where ρ˜t = ρ
∗+ σγ(Ety
f
t+1− y
f
t ), ρ
∗ = ρ− σγγ(1− υ)(Ety
f
t+1− y
f
t )
and piHt is domestic good inflation. Note pi
H
t = pit − γ∆δt where pit is the CPI inflation, δt is the terms
of trade, and γ is the share of foreign produced goods in the consumer price index. In this framework,
the law of one price is assumed to hold such that P f = S ∗ P ∗ where P ∗ is the foreign currency value of
foreign produced goods and S is the nominal exchange rate. The terms of trade is defined as the ratio of
foreign good prices to domestic good prices δt = SP
∗/Ph where Ph is the average price of domestically
produced consumption goods, and the real exchange rate is defined as qt = SP
∗/P c = δt(P
h/P c), where
P c denotes the price level in the domestic country. Hence, it can be shown that the real exchange rate
and the terms of trade is linked as (1 − γ)δt = qt. If we substitute ρ˜t, ρ
∗, piHt and δt into (9.92) and
(9.93), we obtain (4) and (5).
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Equation (1), which can be rewritten as in (4), is the open economy forward look-
ing aggregate demand curve. This equation implies that the expected course of output
(Etxt+1) has a positive effect while the real domestic interest rate (it − Etpit+1) has a
negative effect on output. It also assumes that the expected changes in the real exchange
rate, (Etqt+1 − qt), has a negative effect on the output gap. This is because for a given
(Etpi
F
t+1) an increase in (Etqt+1 − qt) implies a fall of expected domestic good prices and
therefore a reduction in the current domestic inflation.7 This will lead to an appreciation
of domestic currency and switch demand from domestic to foreign goods. Hence, positive
expected changes in the real exchange rate should exert a negative impact on output (and
inflation as discussed below). Finally, the impact of foreign output growth on domestic
output-gap depends on the underlying structural parameters. In particular, we expect for
high values of intertemporal rate of substitution, and elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods (i.e. α, σ) an increase in foreign output to have positive im-
pact on domestic output. However, for other plausible values of α, σ and γ—the share of
foreign produced goods consumed in the domestic country—that researchers have noted
in the literature, expected changes of foreign output may have no impact on domestic
output.
Equation (2) describes an open-economy New-Keynesian Phillips curve. This equation
allows the price setters to adjust the current prices accounting for future marginal costs.
In that sense this equation captures a Calvo-type world in which the price adjustments
take place with a constant probability in a given time. The difference of this equation
from its closed economy version is the inclusion of current and expected future changes
in real exchange rates.8 Here, a rise in the real exchange rate implies a relative increase
in the price of foreign goods in domestic currency. Because foreign goods are consumed
7Here, expected foreign inflation is considered as given because the foreign country is large compare
to the domestic country. Note that Et∆qt+1 = (1− γ)Et∆δt+1 = (1− γ)(Etpi
F
t+1 −Etpi
D
t+1). Therefore,
given Etpi
F
t+1, an increase in Et∆qt+1 is driven by a fall of expected domestic inflation (i.e. Etpi
D
t+1).
8Several other researchers, including Svensson (2000), Ball (1999b) and Leitemo et al. (2002), relate
inflation to changes in real exchange rate. Ball (1999b) argues that changes in the real exchange rate
affects the inflation rate by the import price pass through mechanism which constitute an indirect impact
of exchange rate on domestic inflation.
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by the home country, a rise in foreign goods prices will lead to an increase in consumer
price inflation. However, an expected future rise in the real exchange rate should reduce
current inflation. This is due to the fact that for a given Etpit+1, a rise in the expected
real exchange rate implies a fall in expected future domestic inflation. Hence, the current
domestic inflation should be negatively effected.9
Equation (3) suggests that the real exchange rate is determined according to the UIP
conditions. The foreign nominal interest rate and the foreign expected inflation rate
are denoted by ift and pi
f
t+1, respectively. Hence, the first and the second parenthesized
terms capture the domestic and the foreign real interest rates at time t. Equation (3)
shows that an expected future increase in the domestic real interest rate leads to an
appreciation of the exchange rate as the domestic assets become more attractive. This
equation also shows that an increase in the foreign (domestic) real interest rate will result
in depreciation (appreciation) of the real exchange rate.
2.1 The objective function
Similar to the literature, we assume that the policy makers choose the interest rate based
on the information available at the beginning of time t, before the economic shocks are
realized. The policy authorities minimize the following intertemporal loss function:
Min Et−1
∞∑
τ=0
βτLt+τ (6)
subject to the dynamics described in Equations (1-3). In Equation (6), β is the discount
factor and Lt stands for the loss function of the central bank at time t. The objective of
the central bank is to choose a path for its instrument, the short term interest rate, to
minimize the expected loss.
Here, we use a linear exponential (linex) loss function that allows policy makers to
weigh positive and negative deviations of output gap and inflation from their respective
9See Walsh (2010) along these lines.
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targets differently.10 Setting the output gap target to zero for simplification purposes,
the loss function takes the following form:
L(pit, yt) =
eµ(pit−pi
∗)
− µ(pit − pi
∗)− 1
µ2
+ λ
eψyt − ψyt − 1
ψ2
(7)
where the parameters µ and ψ capture asymmetries in the objective function with respect
to inflation and output gap, respectively. The policy preference towards inflation stabi-
lization is normalized to one and λ represents the relative aversion of the policy maker
towards output fluctuations around its long run level. The inflation target set by the
central banker is denoted by pi∗.
The significance of µ and ψ identifies whether the policy maker has an asymmetric
response towards inflation and output gap, respectively. For instance, a positive value
for µ implies that the central bank is more worried about inflation exceeding the set
target level pi∗ than falling bellow it. This is because if µ > 0 and (pit− pi
∗) > 0 then the
exponential term (eµ(pit−pi
∗)) will rule over the linear component. Thus, positive deviations
of inflation from the target level pi∗ will have a dominant effect on policy makers’ loss
function. The reverse is true if µ < 0 and (pit − pi
∗) < 0. In a similar vein, we can argue
that should the central bank place more weight to output contractions (yt < 0), then ψ
must take a negative value such that the exponential in the second term (eψyt) plays the
dominant role. However, if the policy maker is worried about the economy overshooting
its long run growth (yt > 0), then we should observe a positive value for ψ.
Besides the idea that the policymakers can have asymmetric preferences regarding
the state of inflation and output gap, the linex function allows discretion on the part of
the central bank so that the higher moments of inflation and the output gap might play
an important role in designing optimal policy rules (see Kim et al. (2005)). In partic-
ular, given that the certainty equivalence does not hold under asymmetric preferences,
uncertainty about inflation and the output gap induces a prudent behavior on the part
10The linex loss function was proposed by Varian (1974). Subsequently, many researchers used this
function to examine optimal policy reaction function of policy makers.
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of the central bank. This is because uncertainty increases the expected marginal cost
of inflation and output gap when these variables deviate from their respective targets.
Hence, this framework can help us understand whether the business cycle fluctuations
have welfare effects beyond the first order or not. Finally, the model nests the quadratic
preferences as a special case. The loss function reduces to symmetric parametrization
when both µ and ψ are equal to zero, which can be empirically tested.
2.1.1 Solution of the model
To solve the model, we first substitute Equation (3) into (1) and (2). After rearranging
the terms, we obtain:
yt = α0 + α1Etyt+1 − (α2 + α3)(it − Etpit+1) + α3(i
f
t − Etpi
f
t+1)
−α4(Ety
f
t+1 − y
f
t ) + ε
y
t+1 (8)
pit = α0β2 + β1Etpit+1 + α1β2yt+1 − [β2(α2 + α3) + β3](it − Etpit+1)
+(β2α3 + β3)(i
f
t − Etpi
f
t+1)+β4(qt − qt−1)− α4β2(Ety
f
t+1 − y
f
t ) + β2ε
y
t + ε
pi
t (9)
Next, we substitute (8) and (9) into Equation (7) and obtain the following first order
condition with respect to the current interest rate, it:
Et−1
∂L(pit, yt)
∂it
=
−(β2α2 + β2α3 + β3)
µ
Et−1[e
µ(pit−pi∗)
− 1]−
λ(α2 + α3)
ψ
Et−1[e
ψyt
− 1] (10)
Assuming that the demand and supply shocks (εyt and ε
pi
t ) are normally distributed, the
expected value of the exponential terms takes the form e[µ(pit|t−1−pi
∗+µ
2
σ2pi,t)] and e(
ψ2
2
σ2y,t),
where σ2pi,t and σ
2
y,t denote the conditional variance of inflation and output gap, respec-
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tively.11 Thus, we can rewrite Equation (10) as follows:
Et−1
∂L(pit, yt)
∂it
=
−(β2α2 + β2α3 + β3)
µ
[e(µ(pit|t−1−pi
∗)+(µ
2
2
)σ2pi,t) − 1]−
λ
ψ
(α2 + α3)[e
(ψ
2
2
σ2y,t) − 1] (11)
After linearizing12 Equation (11),
Et−1
∂L(pit, yt)
∂it
=
−(β2α2 + β2α3 + β3)
µ
[(µ(Et−1pit−pi
∗)+(
µ2
2
)σ2pi,t)]−
λ
ψ
(α2+α3)(
ψ2
2
σ2y,t),
we can solve for the expected inflation as:
Et−1pit = pi
∗
−
µ
2
σ2pi,t −
λ(α2 + α3)
(β2α2 + β2α3 + β3)
[(
ψ
2
)σ2y,t] (12)
Last, we use equations (8) and (12) to obtain the central bank’s forward looking policy
rule:
it = ϕ0 + ϕ1Et−1yt+1 + ϕ2Et−1pit+1 + ϕ3(qt − qt−1) (13)
+ ϕ4Et−1(i
f
t − pi
f
t+1) + ϕ5(Ety
f
t+1 − y
f
t ) + ϕ6σ
2
pi,t + ϕ7σ
2
y,t + (error)
The policy rule given in Equation (13) differs from the standard Taylor rule on three
facets. First, it incorporates forward looking expressions of output gap and the rate
of inflation. Second, the policy rule contains variables including the real exchange rate,
foreign interest rate, and the foreign output gap that reflect the fact that we are examining
the central bank’s policy rule in an open economy environment. Third, it allows us to
examine whether the policy makers have asymmetric preferences through the significance
of coefficients associated with output gap volatility and inflation rate volatility. Last,
based on the parametrization of equations (1-5), we can show that the reduced form
11Recall that output gap is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. Hence, Et−1 exp(ψyt)
is log normally distributed with mean equal to e
ψ2
2
σ2y,t .
12See Uhlig (1999) for a thorough explanation of the linearization process.
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parameters of the policy rule, (ϕi), which we use to sign the coefficients and to carry out
our calibration exercise, take the following form:
ϕ0 =
α0β2 − pi
∗
(α2 + α3)β2 + β3
, ϕ1 =
α1β2
(α2 + α3)β2 + β3
, ϕ2 =
β1 + (α2 + α3)β2 + β3
(α2 + α3)β2 + β3
ϕ3 =
β4
(α2 + α3)β2 + β3
, ϕ4 =
α3β2 + β3
(α2 + α3)β2 + β3
, ϕ5 =
α4β2
(α2 + α3)β2 + β3
ϕ6 =
µ/2
(α2 + α3)β2 + β3
, ϕ7 =
λ(α2 + α3)(ψ/2)
[(α2 + α3)β2 + β3]
2
3 Empirical issues
The policy rule in Equation (13) embodies expected future domestic and foreign output
gap, and expected inflation. To compute the expected values (forecasts) of these vari-
ables we utilize autoregressive models where the model lag length is determined by the
Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). As an
alternative, we also use bivariate vector autoregressive models (VAR) to forecast infla-
tion and the output gap. We select optimal forecasting models on the basis of a forecast
rationality test and on the root mean square forecast error (RMSFE) criterion.13 This
exercise shows that the forecasts based on the AR approach outperforms the forecasts
generated by the VAR approach.14 Subsequently, we use forecasts obtained from the AR
models to estimate Equation (13). It should be noted that the foreign real interest rate
is calculated as the deviation of nominal interest rate from the expected inflation rate of
the base country (the USA).
To estimate equation (13) we must also generate a proxy for both inflation and out-
put gap volatilities. To generate our inflation and output gap volatility measures, we
implement ARCH/GARCH methodology. As Pagan (1984) and Pagan and Ullah (1988)
point out, the use of generated regressors may lead to some problems in estimation and
13Tests for forecast rationality indicate whether forecast errors are not significantly different from zero.
14In particular, while both AR and VAR models generate unbiased forecasts there is evidence that the
forecasts produced by the former approach yield lower RMSFE than the latter approach. Note that the
Diebold and Mariano (1995) test accept the null hypothesis that forecasts generated by AR and VAR
models are equal. These results are available from the author upon request.
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statistical inference. According to Pagan (1984) although one may overcome these prob-
lems by using instrumental variables approach, the use of lagged series as instruments
may not be possible when the variable under consideration is a function of the entire
history of the available data. In such cases, Pagan and Ullah (1988) suggest testing the
validity of the underlying assumptions of the model that is used to generate the proxy.15
We generate output gap and inflation volatility measures implementing GARCH(p,q) or
ARCH(p) models. After we carefully check whether these models are well specified and
there is no any neglected heteroscedasticity, we use lags of these proxies as instruments
in estimating our model.
We estimate Equation (13) implementing the generalized method of moments (GMM)
technique as we replace the unobserved expectations with forecasts derived from AR
models and the volatility terms with proxies derived from GARCH models. In doing
so we face two major issues concerning the instruments employed in estimation. First,
the reliability of our econometric methodology depends crucially on the validity of the
instruments which we evaluate by computing the Sargan–Hansen J test of overidentifying
restrictions. A rejection of the null hypothesis that instruments are orthogonal to errors
would indicate that the estimates are not consistent. We also test for the presence of
the first and second order serial correlation so as to determine the correct lag structure
of the instrument set. For each model we present below, the Hansen J statistic and the
autocorrelation tests show that our instruments are appropriate and our models do not
suffer from serial correlation.
An important problem in implementing the GMM methodology is the possibility that
the instruments could be weak. Weak instruments will distort the distribution of the
estimators and the test statistics will lead to misleading statistical inference.16 For re-
liability of the instrumental variables approach, the instruments should be relevant and
strongly correlated with the endogenous variables. In our case, the weak identification
15Many other researchers have followed a similar approach. See for instance Ruge-Murcia (2003).
16For a review of weak instruments see for instance Stock et al. (2002). For the impact of weak
instruments on statistical inference see for instance Hansen et al. (1996).
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test proposed by Stock and Yogo (1999) might not be applicable because their approach
does not account for non i.i.d. errors from a model such as (13) which is estimated using
GMM.17 An alternative approach is to use the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk statistic,
which is an F-test accounting for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. However, there
is no formal basis to compare the Kleibergen-Paap F-test statistic to the critical values
of Stock and Yogo (1999). Thus, when using the rk statistic for weak identification one
should use the critical values of Stock and Yogo (1999) with a caution.18 Instead of rely-
ing on the Kleibergen-Paap F-test statistic, we also use inference methods that are robust
to weak instruments.19 This includes the Anderson-Rubin (A − R) test (Anderson and
Rubin (1949)) which is robust to weak instruments because the null hypothesis is less
likely to be rejected as instruments become irrelevant.20 For all models that we report
below, we observe that the Kleibergen-Paap F-test statistic is above the critical values
given in Stock and Yogo (2005) and the A − R Wald test reject the null of irrelevant
instruments. Hence, we conclude that our models do not suffer from the weak instru-
mentation problem. Furthermore, test statistics for underidentification provide evidence
that the null of underidentification is rejected for all models.
3.1 Data sources and definition of variables
To estimate the policy rule given in Equation (13), we employ quarterly data for Canada
and the UK while we consider the US as the base country. To avoid the impact of
the 2008 financial crises, we set the end date of our investigation as of the last quarter
of 2007 and cover the period between 1983q1-2007q4. We implement the HP (Hodrick
17The test statistic proposed by Stock and Yogo (1999) is an F-test, which requires the assumption
that the estimated residuals from (13) follows an i.i.d. process.
18In particular, we apply the ‘rule of thumb’ suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) that the F-
statistic should be at least 10 for weak identification. Note that this threshold increases with the number
instruments.
19These procedures are robust to weak instruments in the sense that they have the correct size re-
gardless of the value of the concentration statistics. The concentration statistics can be considered as
the smallest eigenvalue of the concentration matrix which can be thought as a multivariate signal-noise
ratio obtained from the first stage regression of the endogenous variables on the instruments.
20For a detailed discussion on robust inference with weak instruments see Stock et al. (2002) and Baum
et al. (2007).
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and Prescott (1997)) filter to compute the output gap for each country. We use the
overnight interbank rate for the UK and the overnight money market rate for Canada. In
estimating our model, we use CPI inflation rate as suggested in Svensson (2000).21 The
data are collected from the international financial statistics (IFS) database published by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the datastream database.
4 Results
To our knowledge the analytical model that we have derived is the first to explore the
optimal policy rule of a central bank taking into account the asymmetric preferences of
the policy makers within the context of an open economy New-Keynesian framework. In
what follows, using data from Canada and the UK, we present our empirical findings and
a calibration exercise that we carried out to check for the robustness of our findings.
Overall, we have two sets of key results. First, we observe that the monetary policy
reacts to inflationary pressures driven by both domestic and foreign factors. That is the
central bank not only reacts to changes in expected inflation and output gap but also to
changes in the real exchange rate, the foreign real interest rate and the foreign output gap.
Second, we provide empirical evidence that central banks have asymmetric preferences.
The empirical results for Canada and the UK are given in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
Each table presents four variants of Equation (13). In each model we use four quarter
ahead forecast horizon to proxy the forward looking variables. The first column depicts
results for the full open economy model which assumes that the policy makers use an
asymmetric loss function with respect to both inflation and output gap. The model in
column 2 relaxes the assumption of asymmetry for output gap only; the model in column
3 relaxes the assumption of asymmetry for inflation only; and the model in column 4
relaxes the assumption of asymmetry for both inflation and output gap.
21In our empirical analysis, we do not examine domestic inflation for it is more relevant in estimating
the policy rule of a closed economy.
15
4.1 Results for Canada
Table 1 provides our results for Canada. In all columns of this table, we observe that
the impact of expected output gap (ϕ1) on the monetary policy rule is negative. The
negative sign is expected because, unlike in the case of standard policy rules, the impact
of expected output on nominal interest rate in our optimal policy rule is driven by a set
of underlying parameters which render the output gap coefficient to take a negative sign.
In particular, observing the underlying parameters of ϕ1 =
α1β2
(α2+α3)β2+β3
we can note that
the numerator takes a positive sign α1β2 > 0 while the denominator takes a negative sign,
[(α2 + α3)β2 + β3] < 0. Similar to the existing models, the impact of expected inflation
on the policy rule should be positive. In fact, for all cases we find that the impact of
expected inflation on the policy rule is positive (ϕ2 > 0) and significant.
We next focus on the impact of the real exchange rate and that of the real foreign
interest rate on the policy rule. The table shows for all cases that the coefficient associated
with the real exchange rate is negative and significant (ϕ3 < 0) and that with the real
foreign interest rate is positive and significant (ϕ4 > 0). These observations are consistent
with our model.22 Currency depreciation will cause an increase in current and expected
inflation leading to lower domestic output and nominal interest rate. In contrast, an
increase in the foreign interest rate will generate an expected appreciation of the real
exchange rate, putting an upward pressure on the domestic inflation and hence on the
domestic interest rate.23 We also observe that the base country output gap (in our context
the US output-gap) has a positive impact (ϕ5 > 0) on the optimal policy rule. This might
be driven by high elasticity of substitution across time and goods (i.e. domestic and
foreign). Under such circumstances, foreign output will have positive effects on domestic
22Given that ϕ3 = β4/((α2+α3)β2+β3), the sign of this coeffcient should be negative as the numerator
is positive (β4 > 0; see equation (1)) and the denominator is negative (((α2 + α3)β2 + β3) < 0; see
equations 1 and 2). Likewise, given ϕ4 = (α3β2 + β3)/((α2 + α3)β2 + β3), the sign of this coefficient
should be positive as both the numerator and the denominator take a negative sign as discussed earlier.
23The real UIP indicates that a rise of foreign real interest rate will lead to an appreciation of the
expected real exchange rate (Etqt+1 − qt < 0). For a given expected foreign inflation (Etpi
F
t+1), an
expected apreciation will be generated by an increase in expected domestic inflation (Etpi
D
t+1) putting an
upward pressure on current interest rate. Here, an increase of foreign interest rate will have a positive
impact on domestic interest rate.
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output and nominal interest rates.
When we inspect the coefficients that capture the asymmetric preferences of the policy
makers we gather the following observations. We observe that the coefficient associated
with inflation volatility (ϕ6) is not significant, and that with output-gap asymmetry (ϕ7)
is negative and significant. This implies that policy makers have negative output-gap
asymmetry (ψ < 0), supporting the view that BoC is more averse to recessions than to
expansions. That is BoC acts more rigorously when output falls below the set target level
than when it exceeds it. This observation can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, one can
suggest that the BoC pursues a policy that favors output growth when the output falls
below its long run trend. However, this interpretation is in conflict with the mandate of
the Bank which does not raise any claims about achieving output stability through the use
of its instruments. Alternatively, one may argue that negative output gap implies future
declines in the rate of inflation which can destabilize the economy were the interest rates
to approach towards the lower bound. Therefore, a negative output gap would initiate
a more rigorous response than the case when the gap exceeds the set target.24 This
alternative interpretation agrees with the objectives of the BoC.
It should be noted that although the results presented in columns 2–4 are consistent
with the full model in column 1, the Wald tests concerning the joint significance of the
coefficients associated with the exchange rate and the base country real interest rate and
that with the volatility terms reject the null of non-significance across all four models. In
the light of this observation, we argue that the variables that relate to the open economy
and those that capture the asymmetric preferences are relevant in constructing a policy
rule for Canada.
24Earlier Claus (2000) has shown for New Zealand that when the output gap is negative (positive) two
times out of three inflation will decrease (increase) in the next quarter and three times out of five it will
decrease (increase) the following year.
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4.2 Results for the UK
Table 2 presents our findings for the UK. Inspecting the table, we see that the coefficient
estimates of the expected output-gap (ϕ1) is insignificant for all cases. The impact
of expected inflation on the interest rate is significant and positive (ϕ2 > 0). When
we examine the impacts of the real exchange rate and the foreign real interest rate on
the policy measure, we see that their effects are similar to that for Canada. The real
exchange rate has a negative and a sizable impact on the UK interest rate (ϕ3 < 0).
This observation is consistent with our model and suggests that a devaluation of the real
exchange rate will lead to a reduction in domestic output putting a downward pressure
on the domestic interest rate. In contrast, we find that the foreign real interest rate has
a positive and significant impact on the domestic interest rate (ϕ4 > 0): an increase
in the foreign interest rate leads to an expected appreciation of the real exchange rate
putting an upward pressure on the domestic interest rate. Similar to the case of Canada
we find that the impact of foreign output on domestic interest rate is positive (ϕ5 > 0)
and insignificant.
When we examine whether the BoE responds asymmetrically towards inflation or
output gap, we find that both of the coefficients associated with inflation volatility and
output-gap volatility (ϕ6 and ϕ7) are positive and significant. Thus, the BoE has a
positive inflation and output-gap asymmetry (i.e., µ > 0 and ψ > 0). This observation
suggests that the BoE reacts more rigorously when the output-gap is positive so that
future inflation can be contained. Likewise, when expected inflation is above the target,
the bank acts rigorously to bring the inflation level closer to its target.
As in the case of Canada, the coefficient estimates across all variants of the model
are similar. The Wald tests concerning the joint significance of the coefficients associated
with the base country (the US) variables and that with the volatility terms reject the
null of non-significance across all four models. Here, too, we conclude that the inclusion
of the variables that capture the open economy features along with those that capture
policy asymmetry is important for the UK.
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4.3 Calibration
In this section we calibrate our structural models using the parameter estimates reported
in Tables 1-2 to asses which of the four models represent the data better. More specifically,
although the structural parameters (pi∗, α0, α1, α2, α3, α4, β1, β2, β3, β4, α, σ, γ) are
not identifiable from the estimated reduced-form coefficients (ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4, ϕ5, ϕ6,
ϕ7), we can estimate the free parameters after setting four of the structural parameters
to the values reported in the literature. In particular, given the estimates for αi (i =
0, 1, · · · , 4), we can compute the inflation asymmetry parameter µ. Also for different
values of policy preference (λ) and βj (j = 1, 2, · · · , 4) we can compute the output-
gap asymmetry parameter ψ. We, then, calibrate the remaining parameters to check if
their values fall within a reasonable interval. In Table 3, we present our observations for
models 1 and 2 for which we obtain theoretically meaningful results. We, next, discuss
the implications of our findings.
The calibration of the structural parameters includes two stages. In the first stage
we compute the parameters in Equations (1-3)—(α0, α1, α2, α3, α4, β1, β2, β3, β4) . In
the second stage, we use the estimated parameters from the first stage to compute α, σ
and γ. In particular, we set β1 equal to the sample average value of exp(
−it
400
), where i is
the short-term nominal interest rate β2 ∈ [−0.9, 0.9], γ ∈ [0.05, 0.7] and pi
∗ = pi where
pi is the sample average inflation. Note that the selected range of values of γ is based
on Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) and Chen and MacDonald (2012). We then compute
β3 =
β1γ
1−γ
for different values of γ. We assume α1 = 1 and we construct Φ for each value
of β2 as:
25
Φ =
β2
ϕ1
25In the New-Keynesian model α1 = 1.
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Thereafter, one can show that
α0 =
ϕ0Φ + pi
∗
β2
, α3 =
ϕ4Φ− β3
β2
, α2 =
Φ− β3 − α3β2
β2
α4 =
ϕ5Φ
β2
, β4 = ϕ3Φ, µ = 2Φϕ7, and ψ =
2Φ2ϕ6
λ(α2 + α3)
We select the optimal parameters by minimizing the distance between the actual and
fitted values of the output gap and inflation by calculating the minimum mean square
error (MMSE). Having estimated the demand and supply parameters, we can compute
the deep structural parameters concerning the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign consumption goods (α) and the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (σ). In particular, we compute26:
σ = σγ[1− γ(1− υ)]
where σγ =
1
α2
and υ = γ−α4
γ
.27 Next, we can solve for α that
α =
1 + υ − γ
(2− γ)σ
4.4 Calibration results
Table 3 presents the structural parameters for Canada and the UK obtained from our
calibration exercise. We find that model 1 performs better for Canada providing support
for our argument that the BoC not only reacts to foreign variables but also accounts for
the uncertainty concerning the deviation of inflation and output gap from their respective
targets. In the case of the UK, we find that model 2 performs better than the other
alternatives implying that the BoE reacts to foreign variables and to inflation uncertainty.
For both countries, the computed structural parameters are within plausible values.
Although the impact of output gap on inflation is close to zero (β2 = 0.04 for Canada,
26For the definition of σ see Walsh (2010), pp. 438.
27Note that α4 =
γ(1−υ)
γ
.
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and = 0.08 for the UK), this observation is similar to that of Rudd and Whelan (2007)
and Mavroeidis et al. (2013) who find that the impact of inflation on output gap is
not significantly different from zero. We also observe that in all cases both current and
expected values of the real exchange rates affect output and inflation equations with the
correct sign. Expected changes of the real exchange rate exerts a negative impact on
output (Equation 1, α3) and inflation (Equation 2, β3), while the current changes in the
real exchange rate has a positive impact on inflation (Equation 2, β4). This is consistent
with our observations in section 4 regarding the reaction of central banks to changes in
the real exchange rate for the UK and Canada.
It is worth noting that the impact of expected changes in real exchange rate is a
function of the rate of substitution between domestic and foreign goods as well as the
intertemporal rate of substitution. Estimates of the import share parameter γ is rather
low. However, this might be a reflection of the impact of deviations from the UIP on the
demand and supply curves.28 The computed value of α is positive and below one. This
implies that domestic and foreign goods are substitutes. Thus, an expected appreciation
of the real exchange rate, driven by a decline in domestic inflation, will switch demand
from foreign goods to domestic goods. The intertemporal rate of substitution coefficient
(σ) found to be positive and lower than 1 for Canada and greater than 1 for the UK. This
implies that agents smooth consumption more aggressively in the UK than in Canada.
Overall, the calibration exercise confirms that in formulating a monetary policy rule it is
important to work within an open economy framework. This is because changes in the
real exchange rate and variables such as base country real interest rate and output have
significant impact on domestic output and inflation. Thus omission of open economy
variables from the model would potentially lead to policy rules which may destabilize
domestic growth and inflation.
28The low value of γ may be a result of the omission of risk premium under the assumption that UIP
holds. Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) provide a detailed interpretation concerning low estimates of import
of share parameter.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, in contrast with the existing literature, we construct an analytical model
within the context of an open economy New-Keynesian macroeconomic framework to
investigate the optimal policy rule of a central bank assuming that the policymakers en-
tertain asymmetric preferences. Using our analytical framework, we show that monetary
policymakers not only respond asymmetrically to deviations of the domestic inflation and
that of the output gap from their respective targets, but they also react to the real ex-
change rate, foreign country output gap, foreign country real interest rate, the volatility
of inflation and the volatility of the output gap. In this context, the model presents us
with a policy rule with which one can empirically examine the asymmetric behavior of
policymakers within an open economy framework.
We estimate the derived policy rule for Canada and the UK using the generalized
method of moments (GMM) technique. The data are on a quarterly basis and span the
period between 1983q1-2007q4. The empirical results can be summarized in two main
categories. First, we show that the open economy variables including the real exchange
rate and the foreign real interest rate affect the determination of the monetary policy
rule rate in the UK and Canada. Second, we find evidence that both central banks have
asymmetric preferences. In particular, we find that the BoC has negative output gap
asymmetry. This result suggest that the BoC aims at responding rigorously when output
gap falls below the set target to avoid low future inflation rate which can destabilize the
economy. This behavior agrees with the objectives of the bank as the mandate of the
BoC is to keep inflation low and stable. In the case of the UK, we find that the BoE has
positive inflation and positive output-gap asymmetries. This allows one to argue that the
Bank will systematically over-predict inflation and output-gap. Under such circumstances
interest rate will increase and inflation and output-gap will be below the set target levels.
Robustness checks based on model calibration support our modeling framework.
To broaden our understanding, we suggest that it would be fruitful to expand the
22
set of countries under investigation. Furthermore, it might be useful to exploit the cross-
equation restrictions in estimating the model using a full-information maximum likelihood
approach. These can be taken as future research.
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Table 1: GMM Estimates for Canada
Panel A: Estimation Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ϕ0 1.285* 0.301* 1.434*** 0.622***
(0.480) (0.349) (0.447) (0.227)
ϕ1 -0.192** -0.108 -0.187** -0.064
(0.087) (0.098) (0.089) (0.099)
ϕ2 2.971** 2.475*** 2.832*** 2.591***
(0.359) (0.399) (0.381) (0.398)
ϕ3 -5.534* -6.488* -5.715* -5.961*
(3.314) (3.778) (3.330) (3.651)
ϕ4 0.718*** 0.821*** 0.724*** 0.760***
(0.063) (0.068) (0.068) (0.071)
ϕ5 0.389** 0.372* 0.350* 0.388*
(0.209) (0.228) (0.211) 0.224)
ϕ6 0.370 0.477
(0.518) (0.596)
ϕ7 -1.552*** -1.472**
(0.535) (0.580)
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests
Observations 104 104 104 104
Underidentification(p-value)† 0.015 0.004 0.025 0.001
Weakidentification(F-test)‡ 24.406 33.159 23.784 38.870
Weak Inst.Test(F-test)§ (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Weak Inst.Test(χ2)♣ (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock-Wright Stats.(χ2)♠ (0.101) (0.097) (0.049) (0.045)
J stat (p-value) 0.146 0.212 0.135 0.274
AR(1) 0.318 0.317 0.318 0.317
AR(2) 0.318 0.317 0.318 0.317
Panel C: The Wald Test(Joint Significance)
H0 : ϕ3; ...;ϕ5 = 0 312.360*** 400.480*** 254.030*** 116.38***
H0 : ϕ6;ϕ7 = 0 8.640**
H0 : ϕ3;ϕ4;ϕ5;ϕ6 = 0 421.79*** 341.25
H0 : ϕ3;ϕ4;ϕ5;ϕ7 = 0 472.88***
H0 : ϕ3; ...;ϕ7 = 0 532.830***
Notes: it = ϕ0+ ϕ1Etyt+1 +ϕ2Etpit+1 + ϕ3∆qt + ϕ4(i
f
t − Etpi
f
t+1) + ϕ5Ety
f
t+1 + ϕ6σ
2
pi,t + ϕ7σ
2
y,t
In Panel A, values in parenthesis are standard errors. ***,**, and * indicate level of signifi-
cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. Panel C reports the Wald test for
testing the joint significance of the underlying coefficients.
† represents the the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistictesting the null hypothesis that the equation is
under identified.
‡ represents the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the equation is
weakly identified. § represents weak instrument robustness test based on Anderson-rubin Wald test.
The critical values are based on the F-test. The values in parenthesis shows the p-values.
♣ displays the weak instrument robustness test based on Anderson-rubin Wald test. The critical
values are based on the (χ2) test. The values in parenthesis shows the p-values.
♠ indicates the Weak instrument robustness test based on Stock-Wright LM S statistics. The critical
values are based on the (χ2) test. The values in parenthesis shows the p-values.
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Table 2: GMM Estimates for UK
Panel A: Estimation Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ϕ0 0.139 0.234 0.375 0.728**
(0.391) (0.411) (0.286) (0.322)
ϕ1 0.050 -0.174 0.109 -0.158
(0.157) (0.162) (0.173) (0.177)
ϕ2 1.273*** 1.574*** 1.802*** 2.245***
(0.294) (0.330) (0.261) (0.278)
ϕ3 -7.393** -8.481*** -6.521** -6.063**
(2.397) (2.886) ( 2.842) (2.733)
ϕ4 0.688*** 0.699*** 0.761*** 0.799***
(0.063) (0.069) (0.051) (0.059)
ϕ5 -0.197 0.181 -0.590 -0.204
(0.151) (0.167) (0.167) (0.168)
ϕ6 2.107*** 2.497***
(0.409) (0.440)
ϕ7 1.594*** 2.403***
(0.508) (0.494)
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests
Observations 104 104 104 104
Underidentification(p-value)† 0.029 0.022 0.014 0.011
Weakidentification(F-test)‡ 101.696 97.409 92.198 55.334
Weak Inst.Test(F-test)§ (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Weak Inst.Test(χ2)♣ (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock-Wright Stats.(χ2)♠ (0.027) (0.026) (0.005) (0.028)
J stat (p-value) 0.143 0.137 0.130 0.130
AR(1) 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.318
AR(2) 0.318 0.319 0.318 0.318
Panel C: The Wald Test(Joint Significance)
H0 : ϕ3; ...;ϕ5 = 0 120.07*** 123.490*** 234.990*** 186.790***
H0 : ϕ6;ϕ7 = 0 51.24***
H0 : ϕ3;ϕ4;ϕ5;ϕ6 = 0 243.450***
H0 : ϕ3;ϕ4;ϕ5;ϕ7 = 0 253.370***
H0 : ϕ3; ...;ϕ7 = 0 355.11***
Notes: it = ϕ0+ ϕ1Etyt+1 +ϕ2Etpit+1 + ϕ3∆qt + ϕ4(i
f
t − Etpi
f
t+1) + ϕ5Ety
f
t+1 + ϕ6σ
2
pi,t + ϕ7σ
2
y,t
In Panel A, values in parenthesis are standard errors. ***,**, and * indicate level of signifi-
cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. Panel C reports the Wald test for
testing the joint significance of the underlying coefficients.
† represents the the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the equation is
under identified.
‡ represents the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the equation
is weakly identified.
§ represents weak instrument robustness test based on Anderson-rubin Wald test. The critical values
are based on the F-test. The values in parenthesis shows the p-values.
♣ displays the weak instrument robustness test based on Anderson-rubin Wald test. The critical
values are based on the (χ2) test. The values in parenthesis shows the p-values.
♠ indicates the Weak instrument robustness test based on Stock-Wright LM S statistics. The critical
values are based on the (χ2) test. The values in parenthesis shows the p-values.29
Table 3: Results from Calibration
Parameter estimates Canada UK
based on (Model 1) (Model 2)
α0 2.369 2.343
α1 1.000 1.000
α2 -0.367 -0.432
α3 -1.619 -1.308
α4 -0.507 -0.260
β1 0.984 0.981
β2 0.040 0.080
β3 -0.109 -0.097
β4 1.153 3.899
α 0.336 0.728
σ 0.780 3.450
γ 0.040 0.090
Diagnostic Tests
RMSEaInfl 0.516 0.953
RMSEbOG 1.488 1.601
BiascInfl 0.185 0.465
BiasdOG 0.479 0.464
Note: Model 1 is the unrestricted model. Model 2 imposes zero restriction on output asymmetry. a
(b) denotes RMSE of inflation (output-gap). c (d) denotes the probability that the forecast error of
inflation (output-gap) is equal to zero
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